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TAXATION - FEDERAL EsTATE TAX - WHAT rs A GENERAL PowER
OF APPOINTMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FEDERAL STATUTEr Decedent exercised her testamentary power to appoint the income of a dis-cretionary trust. The commissioner declared a tax deficiency for failure to
include the property subject to the power in the gross estate. The executor
appealed on the ground that the power was a special power under Wisconsin
law since the trustee could withhold the income from any beneficiary. Held,
the power was general since it was exercisable in favor of the donee's estate
or her creditors and therefore the exercise of the power was taxable under

1940

J

RECENT DECISIONS
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section 302(£) of the Revenue Act of 1926.1 Morgan v. Commissioner, 309
U.S. 78, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940).
A general power of appointment is technically defined as one exercisable in
favor of "whomsoever the donee pleases." 2 Since the Supreme Court has declared
that it is not bound to construe taxing statutes in accord with the intricacies of
property law, 8 it is understandable that a different definition may be proper for
tax purposes.4 So the treasury department has defined a general power to be one
which, though the possible appointees are limited, is exercisable in favor of the
donee, his estate, or his creditors. 5 Such a power, exercisable by will only, has
been held to be general for tax purposes. 6 Though the power is to appoint an
interest less than a fee, it is not thereby rendered special.7 Tax uniformity requires that the classification of powers by state law be not determinative as to
their taxability. The federal government should be free to formulate its own
1 This requires inclusion in the gross estate of all property of the decedent except
real property situated outside the United States "To the extent of any property passing
under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent (I) by will. • • ."
Sec. 302 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 71, as amended by § 803 (b)
of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 279, 26 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 811 (f).
This provision was re-enacted as § 811 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53
Stat. L. I 22.
2 SuGDEN, PowERS, 8th ed., 394 (1861); 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 246
(1936).
8 "The importation of these distinctions and controversies from the law of property into the administration of the estate tax precludes a fair and workable tax system•
• • . Distinctions which originated under a feudal economy when land dominated social
relations are peculiarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures now so largely
directed toward intangible wealth." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 116 at 118, 60
S. Ct. 444 (1940).
4 Gump, "The Meaning of 'General' Powers of Appointment under the Federal
Estate Tax," I MD. L. REv. 300 (1937); Schuyler, "Powers of Appointment and
Especially Special Powers: The Estate Taxpayer's Last Stand," 33 ILL. L. REv. 771
(1939); Griswold, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV.
L. REv. 929 (1939); 1 SIMES, FuTURE INTERESTS, § 246 (1936).
5 "Ordinarily a general power is one to appoint to any person or persons in the
discretion of the donee of the power, or, however limited as to the persons or objects
in whose favor the appointment may be made, is exercisable in favor of the donee,
his estate, or his creditors." Treas. Reg. 80, art. 24 (1937). The principal case holds
that Congress has adopted this administrative construction by successive re-enactment of
§ 302 (f). 309 U. S. at 80. Cf. Rasset v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303, 58 S. Ct. 559
(1938).
6 Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 164; FidelityPhiladelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) 34 F. (2d) 600; Blackburne v. Brown, (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 320; Lee v. Commissioner, (App.
D. C. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 399; Minis v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 58 (1928), cert.
den. 278 U.S. 657, 49 S. Ct. 186 (1929).
7 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) 34 F.
,
(2d) 600; Brown v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 298 (1938); Schuyler, "Powers of
Appointment and Especially Special Powers: The Estate Taxpayer's Last Stand," 33
ILL. L. REV. 771 (1939).
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concepts.8 So in the principal case the Wisconsin classification was disregarded.
Though exercisable by will only and though the property subject to the power
was less than a fee, the power would seem to be a general· one, under previous decisions, since there was no limitation upon the persons to whom the donee
might appoint, except for the discretion vested in the trustee to withhold the
income. Where the power to appoint is exercisable only in conjunction with
another, the power has been held to be special since the donee is no longer
"practically the owner" of the property subject to the power. 9 This holding has
been criticized as opening the door to tax evasion, since the party whose consent is necessary may not have an adverse interest.10 There would seem to be
no reason to extend that doctrine further and apply it to a discretionary trust.
In such a case there is only a possibility that the income may be withheld. A
sufficient interest remains in the donee to bring it within the incidence of an
estate tax.
John H. Pickering

8 Gump, "The Meaning of 'General' Powers of Appointment under the Federal
Estate Tax," 1 Mn. L. REV. 300 (1937); Schuyler, "Powers of Appointment and
Especially Special Powers: The Estate Taxpayer's Last Stand," 33 ILL. L. REV. 771
(1939); Griswold, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV.
L. REV. 929 (1939). See Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, (C. C. A.
3d, 1929) 34 F. (2d) 600. Cf. Leser v. Burnet, (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) 46 F. (2d}
756, holding that since the law of Maryland did not permit the donee to appoint
to his creditors, the power was special.
9 Hepburn v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 459 (1938}; Gump, "The Meaning
of 'General' Powers of Appointment under the Federal Estate Tax," 1 Mo. L. REV.
300 (1937); 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,§ 246 (1936). Cf. In re Watts, [1931]
2 Ch. 302, holding such a power to be special for the purpose of the rule against
perpetuities.
10 Schuyler, "Powers of Appointment and Especially Special Powers: The Estate
Taxpayer's Last Stand," 33 ILL. L. REV. 771 (1939). A comparable problem has
arisen where a trust revocable only with the consent of the cestui is sought to be included as part of the decedent settlor's estate under section 302 (d) of the Revenue
Act of 1926 as amended (now Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 8II (d), 53 Stat.
L. 121). See Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 56 S. Ct.
70 (1935). See also Treas. Reg. 80, art. 19 (1937). The principal case is also noted
in 24 MINN. L. REv. 886 (1940).

